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Employment in the New Age of Trade and
Technology: Implications for Labor and
Employment Law
KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT"
INTRODUCTION
Trade and technology have always dictated the nature of the employment
relationship, and accordingly the issues that are important in labor and employment
law. After World War II, advances in our understanding of the uses and hazards of
chemical compounds led to their greater use in the workplace, and their regulation
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA").' Prior to that, the
development of assembly-line technology at the beginning of this century gave rise
to large plant industrial corporations and the industrial union organizing strategy.
Mechanization during the end of the nineteenth century resulted in a dramatic
increase in the frequency and severity of industrial accidents and accordingly resulted
in the workers' compensation movement. Improvements in communications and
transportation during the nineteenth century produced a national economy that
necessitated a national labor policy. Indeed, it was the methods of mass production
and accompanying expansion of trade that developed during the industrial revolution
that gave birth to a class of employees with interests distinct from those of their
employers and so gave rise to the modem employment relationship.2
At this time, on the eve of the twenty-first century, the employment relationship is
once again undergoing a profound change as a result of changes in trade and
technology. The rise of the global economy and recent developments in information
and computer technology have resulted in changes in firm structure and managerial
techniques that have undermined long-termemployment relationships and brought the
market into the firm in ways that have not previously been experienced.3 Continental
* Willard and Margaret Carr Professor of Labor and Employment Law, Indiana
University---Bloomington. B.A., 1978, University of Wisconsin; M.A. (Economics), 1981,
University of Michigan; J.D., 1981, University of Michigan; Ph.D. (Economics), 1984,
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on earlier drafts of this lecture. I would also like to thank Willard and Margaret Carr, whose
generous gift of a professorship is the happy occasion for this lecture. Willard and Margaret
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community. Finally, I dedicate this lecture to my mother, Barbara Bloom, and my wife,
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any problems alone.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
2. See ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 9-10 (1Ith ed.
1991); HAROLD W. DAVEY ET AL, CONTEMPORARY COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING 16 (4th ed.
1982).
3. PETER CAPPELu, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN
WORKFORCE 1 (1999).
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and intercontinental free-trade agreements4 combine with improvements in
transportation and communications to place American workers in competition with
workers across the world, both to attract new capital investments and employers and
to sell the fruits of their labors.5 These same changes have both made possible and
required a new flexibility in fir production methods that allows the out-sourcing of
many jobs and the compartmentalization of production.6 This vertical disintegration
of firms, combined with new managerial techniques such as benchmarking, profit
centers, and core competencies expose every aspect of a firm and every employee to
market pressure." As a result, the American workplace is undergoing a transformation
from a place that was dominated by internal labor markets with corporate
administrative rules and expectations of long-term employment to one which is
governed by an international spot market for labor with no rules or expectations
except payment for product and the prospect of constant change.
This change from being a country that was dominated by internal labor markets
with corporate administrative rules and expectations of long-term employment to one
which is governed by an international spot market for labor raises a host of issues for
our national labor policies and labor and employment law. How do we construct a
legal infrastructure that can govern the employment relationship, an inherently
complex and contestable relationship, after the recession of corporate administrative
rules and long-term employment? In particular, how do we enforce contracts for
employment that adequately allow employers to protect corporate secrets and recoup
training costs without unduly infringing on employee initiative and freedom of
mobility? In an economy that involves more frequent turnover and rearrangement of
employees and payment for product, how do we allow employers to report and assess
potential employees' skills and monitor their productivity, while still adequately
protecting employees from defamation and needless infringements on their privacy?
How do we ensure that employees obtain adequate training to maintain their
productivity and standard ofliving in an economy in which employment relationships
are more serial and short-term and in which employer efforts at on-the-job training
likelyjustbenefit another employer? Moreover, in a labor market in which employees
may have numerous employers over the course of their work life, how do we provide
employees with the semblance of a career, complete with promotions and benefits
comparable to those that were provided in the more long-term employment
relationships of the internal labor market? The increased competitiveness and
turnover of the labor market have only increased obstacles to employee collective
action and negotiation with their employers. How do we insure adequate
opportunities for employee expression of a collective voice in this new environment?
Finally, the globalization of the economy undermines nations' ability to undertake
even efficient regulation that might put their employers at a competitive disadvantage.
4. E.g.,North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, pmbl., 32 I.L.M. 289,297
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
5. Frances Lee Ansley, Rethinking Law in Globalizing Labor Markets, I U. PA. J. LAB.
&EMP. L. 369, 405 (1998).
6. See STEPHEN A. HERZENBERGETAL, NEwRULES FORANEwECONOMY: EMPLOYMENT
AND OPPORTUNrrY IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 108-10 (1998).
7. CAPPELui, supra note 3, at 5.
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How do we maintain democratic values and the rule of law in a country whose
economy dances to the tune of a global economy?
By understanding the shift in the paradigmatic employment relationship that has
occurred in this new age of trade and technology, we can understand why these issues
have come to the forefront of labor and employment law and perhaps also develop
new and appropriate ways to address these issues under the new paradigm.
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Before presenting my full argument, it will be useful to present a brief summary of
some of the economic analyses of the employment relationship. How might the
parties structure the purchase and sale of labor? What might be the advantages and
disadvantages of structuring the employment relationship in various ways? In
examining these questions I will discuss the paradigm of a "spot market" for labor
and the paradigm of an "internal labor marker' that I will use in my later analysis.
A. A Spot Market for Labor
One way to structure the employment relationship is to treat labor like any other
commodity.8 Just as the employer might enter the market on a given day to purchase
the quality and quantity of steel he needs for a given job, so too he might purchase
the hours of labor he needs for ajob from people with the appropriate skills. In such
a case the employment relationship would be a fairly cursory relationship, perhaps
lasting only a few hours. Workers would be paid only for their product on a given
day, and might work for the same employer tfie next day, or perhaps for a different
employer. All transactions wouldbe on amonetarybasis, leaving the employee onhis
own to purchase any health or retirement benefits. The hourly wage for a given type
of labor might vary on a daily basis depending on how many workers of a given skill
showed up at the market that day and how many hours of that skill employers wanted
to employ on that day. Such a market, in which the employer purchases only the
needed hours of labor on a short-term or daily basis is called a "spot market" for
labor.9
There are several advantages, at least for employers, in such a system. For the
employer, a spot market presents a very efficient, low cost, and flexible way to
construct the employment relationship-if it can be managed. The employer
purchases only the types and quantities of labor he needs and, beyond the initial
assessment of employee skills and monitoring their work, needs no costly
administrative staff to handle employee benefits or relations. Moreover, should the
type or quantity of labor the employer needs change tomorrow, the employer can
merely employ different employees with different skills or purchase a different
amount of labor the next day. All of the risk that an employee's skills will lose their
8. The model presented here is a stylized model. Even the purchase ofmany commodities
cannot be conducted in such a simple fashion. Some commodities are specialized and have to
be ordered ahead of time. Others display discontinuities in their consumption, for example, a
foundry of some minimal scale.
9. GEORGE J. BolUAs, LABOR ECONOMICS 401 (1996).
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marketability due to demand deficiency or obsolescence lies squarely on the
employee. Employees too might find benefits in this system, if their skills are in great
demand or they have strong individual preferences about the health or retirement
benefits they purchase. However, given the relative risk adversity of most employees
and the relative inconsequence ofgetting to choose an individualized set of health and
pension benefits, it seems unlikely most employees would highly value their potential
benefits under such a system.
In real life, the problem ofpurchasing labor is usually much more complicated than
the purchase of an ordinary commodity and several problems would predictably
develop under such a transitory employment relationship. First, there is the
employer's problem of adequately assessing employees' skills and monitoring their
productivity. In such a transient labor market, employees would have incentives to
exaggerate their skills and in many situations, such as a shift manager or assembly-
line worker, individual productivity would be hard to assess.'0 Absent adequate
monitoring, payment for product, especially in such short-term relationships, gives
employees incentive to slack and cheat their employer.
Second, there is the problem of ensuring that employees have the skills that the
employers demand. Although under a very simple economic analysis one might
suppose that wage differentials would give employees adequate incentives to borrow
and invest in appropriate training, in real life, banks will not lend money against
future labor, which cannot be compelled without charging a substantial premium,"
and the resulting shortfall in worker investment in training will have to be made up
through public education and on-the-job training. The employer has no incentive to
finance or pay for training that will likely just benefit the employee and other
employers when the employee takes aother job in the spot market for labor.
Third, there is the employees' problem of negotiating efficient terms with respect
to public goods in the workplace.'2 In almost every workplace there are public goods
which affect numerous employees-for example, how fast the assembly-line goes,
the level of air quality in the plant, and common safety features in the plant. If
employees negotiate individually with employers regarding these terms, they have
incentive to "free ride" on improvements negotiated by other employees with the
result being that too little of these goods will be negotiated.'3 Such inadequacies in
individual employment contracts can be addressed through the "collective voice" of
the employees in collective bargaining or through legislation. 4
10. Id. at 316; see also, John H. Pencavel, Work Effort, On-the-Job Screening, and
Alternative Methods of Remuneration, in 1 RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS 225, 231-34
(Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 1977) (discussing different wage payment methods based on
employee productivity).
11. In labor-economics literature this constraint on workers to borrowing only against
liquid assets is known as the "liquidity constraint." Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Effect of
Consumption Commitments and the Liquidity Constraint on Labor Supply, 18 J. ECON. 49,49
(1992).
12. RICHARDB. FREEMAN&JAMESL.MEDOFF, WHATDOUNIONSDO? 7-11, 14-16(1984).
13. Id. at 8-9.
14. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the
Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REv. 419, 431-34 (1992).
Recent theoretical work demonstrates that competitive labor markets need not produce an
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Finally, unlike commodities, employees and their families have to be maintained
even after their productive years are over. Although individual workers might be able
to solve this problem through savings or the purchase of accident insurance and
pension benefits with a portion of their wages, historically workers have seemed to
underprepare for such events and either have not saved adequately or have not
purchased insurance or retirement benefits. 5 Once again government programs and
employer-provided benefits have historically made up for the shortfall.
As a result of these problems, employers have historically sought alternative
employment relationships to that represented by a spot market for labor. Almost all
of these forms of employment relationships involve a longer-term relationship than
that engendered by the spot market. The opposite of the spot market in this regard
would be an employment relationship with an expectation of lifetime employment.
It is to this paradigm of the employment relationship that I now turn.
B. Internal Labor Markets with Lifetime Employment
As an alternative to the spot market for labor, the employer might want to build a
long-term relationship with his employees. Why look for new employees every time
you have a new job when the employees you had on the last job performed
admirably? Indeed, the employer could institutionalize the entire arrangement, hiring
employees into less demanding entry-level positions and promoting them into more
demanding positions based on their performance. 6 If a promising employee needed
efficient level of worker collective voice. E.g., Richard B. Freeman & Edward P. Lazear, An
Economic Analysis of Works Councils, in WORKS COUNCIs: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION
AND COOPERATION 27 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995); David I. Levine & Laura
D'Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the Firm's Environment, in PAYING FOR
PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990). For example,
Freeman and Lazear argue that although worker organization increases both the quantity and'
qualityof information, and thus increases the net surplus of the enterprise, worker organization
also increases worker bargaining power and share of the surplus. Freeman & Lazear, supra, at
34-38. Thus, employers mayresist employee organization efforts even though they increase the
net surplus of the enterprise. See Dau-Schmidt, supra at 470.
15. Historically, prior to the modem statutory schemes, employees relied on a combination
of savings, support from their children, and very modest private and public largesse to support
them during periods of infirmity or retirement. Very few workers had adequate savings or
private insurance policies to cover such periods of unemployment, and as a result voluntary
retirement was a relatively rare phenomenon. WILLAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING,
PENSION PLANS AND PUBuC PoucY 27-29 (1976). Besides, with their control of working
conditions and greater risk-spreading capabilities, it would seem that employers should enjoy
a marked advantage over individual employees in bearing or purchasing insurance to cover the
risk that employees will become injured or infirm. Accordingly, the question of real interest,
at least with respect to workplace injuries, is why employers did not develop adequate private
employer-provided insurance to cover the risk of on-the-job injury in advance of the workers'
compensation system. My own suspicion is that employers did not adequately develop private
insurance as part ofthe employment package because workers systematically underestimate the
risks of workplace injury and accordingly do not place sufficient demand on such employer-
provided benefits, at least in individual bargaining.
16. PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND
20011
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new skills to do anotherjob, the employer could provide on-the-job training to ensure
the employee had the requisite skills." The employer might retain an employee as
long as he or she performed acceptably-perhaps for the employee's entire career."
Once the employer and employee are in a long-term relationship, there is no necessity
that an employee's pay equal his or her productivity during a given period.'9 As long
as the present value of the employee's expected total pay does not exceed the present
value of his or her expected worth to the firm, the employer might defer some of the
employee's compensation as a reward for productive behavior or to maintain the
employee during times when his or her productivity does not equal the agreed wage.20
The institutionalization of such an employment relationship is known as an "internal
labor market" because the relationship of the parties is governed by the employer's
internal administrative rules as to hiring, compensation, and promotion rather than by
an external labor market.2
The major advantage of an internal labor market with lifetime employment is that
it solves most of the shortcomings of a spot market for labor previously discussed.
Long-term employment lessens the costs of evaluating and monitoring employees
since the employer does not have to continually evaluate new employees and has a
reliable work history upon which to base his or her evaluation.
Moreover, the employer can lower employee-monitoring costs by deferring a
portion of the employee's pay over his or her "life-cycle;" paying the employee less
than his marginal product early in his career and paying the employee more than his
marginal product late inhis career.' Under such a deferred compensation scheme the
employee has incentive to be productive early in his career so that the employer will
continue to employ him late in his career, and so needs less monitoring.' The
employee will agree to such a deferred compensation scheme as long as he gets a
share of the savings in monitoring costs and the present value of his expected total
wage is higher than what the employer would offer in the absence of such a scheme.
The problem of ensuring that employees gain the skills they need to meet the
employer's needs is also mitigated. With adequate assurances that the employee will
stay with the employer long enough for the employer to recoup his costs, the
employer would be willing to pay for training in skills particular to his firm, and may
even be willing to finance or pay for more generaljob skills.' The employer can help
MANPOWER ANALYsIs 27 (1985).
17. Id. at 106-15.
18. Id. at 29-30.
19. Id. at 65.
20. Id. at 66-73.
21. Id. at 1-2; see RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR
ECONOMICs: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLIcY 318 (1982).
22. EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 21, at 193-201; see GILBERT R. GHEZ & GARY S.
BECKER, THE ALLOCATION OF TIME AND GOODS OVER THE Lim CYCLE ch. 3 (1975).
23. EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 21, at 320-21; Edward P. Lazear, Why is There
Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. POL ECON. 1261, 1264-65 (1979).
24. The employer's problem with paying for general skills is that those skills are valuable
in employment with other employers, and so other employers may bid away the employee once
trained, resulting in the loss of the original employer's investment in general skills. BOPRAs,
supra note 9, at 252-56; see GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPrrAL 33-51 (3d ed. 1993)
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to ensure that he retains the employee long enough to recoup any investment in
training by establishing an employment system that rewards seniority or by sharing
a portion of the employee's increased value to the employer from firm-specific
training.' Shared investment in job training between employers and employees is
another commonly given explanation for the deferral of wages under the "life-cycle"
theory of wages.' Even the problem of negotiating public goods in the workplace is
eased since the employees have a greater investment in a given place of employment
and are thus more likely to organize and express collective concerns about conditions
in the workplace.27
Finally, since the internal labor market severs the connection between pay and
productivity in a given period, it is easier for the employer to provide benefits that
maintain the employee during times of decreased productivity. For example, part of
the deferred compensation scheme adoptedbythe employer to lowermonitoring costs
might be a pension to maintain the employee during his retirement?' Similarly the
employer might devise formal or informal deferred compensation schemes that
maintain the employee during times of modest economic downturn, or when the
employee is sick or injured.
The primary disadvantages ofa lifetime employment relationship under an internal
labor market for the employer are administrative expense and loss of flexibility. In
order to operate an internal labor market, the employer has to hire managers who
evaluate employees and plan how best to use the firm's "human resources."' These
administrators devise and enforce the rules on hiring, compensation, and promotion
that constitute the firm's internal labor market.
Moreover, in order to make the reasonable assurances of continued employment
that allow this system to work, the employer gives up some flexibility in the operation
of his business. For example, under a long-term employment relationship the
employer cannotjustjettison employees whose skills have become obsolete or are no
longer needed by the company. The deferred compensation scheme, which is an
important benefit of internal labor markets and lifetime employment, depends on
employees believing that the employer will live up to his representations of lifetime
employment. If the employer treats employees in ways that are considered unfair or
harsh, this will undermine the employer's ability to make deferred compensation
promises on which the employees believe they can rely.30 Instead of just jettisoning
(discussing general and specific training).
25. When a finn trains an employee, the employee may also feel that he "owes" the firm
a debt of loyalty which will bind the employee to the employer long enough for the employer
to recoup his investment. CAPPELu- supra note 3, at 20.
26. Under this explanation, employees accept wages lower than their marginal product
when they are young in order to invest in their career and in the acquisition of skills, and they
are rewarded for this investment later in their careers with wages above their marginal product.
See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 21, at 231-32.
27. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands of Workers into the Twenty-First
Century: The Future of Labor and Employment Law, 68 IND. L.J. 685, 694 (1993).
28. EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 21, at 323.
29. CAPPELU, supra note 3, at 65-68; PETER CAPPELU ET AL., CHANGEs AT WORK 22-23
(1992):
30. Ifthe employees do not believe they will continue to be employed by the employer and
2001]
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superfluous employees, the employer will have to find ways to usefully integrate the
employees back into the firm by retraining the employees or changing production
methods. Thus, in a long-term employment relationship under an internal labor
market, the employer accepts a certain amount of the risk that the employee's skills
will become obsolete or no longer needed by the firm.
II. THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY
ON THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
As the above discussion demonstrates, there are various advantages and
disadvantages to either constructing the employment relationship as a short-term
relationship through a spot labor market, or as a lifetime relationship through an
internal labor market. At any given time in our economy there are employers who
choose short-term relationships and employers who choose lifetime
relationships-and everything in between. Those who choose short-termrelationships
conducted through a spot market for labor are usually in industries where the
technology of production makes it easy to evaluate individual productivity and
requires low investments in employee skills-for example, landscape gardening or
apparel manufacturing.3' Those who choose long-term relationships conducted
through an internal labor market are usually in industries where the technology of
production makes it hard to evaluate individual productivity and requires high
investments in employee skills-for example, airplane assembly workers and college
professors. 2
Although the American economy currently includes a mix of both short-term and
long-term employment relationships, in this section I will argue that the rise of the
new age of trade and technology has brought the external labormarket into American
firms in ways that we have not previously experienced and shifted the balance in our
economy away from the paradigm of lifetime employment in an internal labor market
and decidedly in favor of the paradigm of short-term or contingent employment in a
spot market. Indeed given the new importance of international trade in our economy,
one can argue that the spot market that defines our employment relationships is an
international spot market that includes competing workers from all over the world.
A. The Golden Age ofLifetime Employment in America
Lifetime employment, governed by an internal labor market, has been the dominant
paradigm of employment relationships in America throughout the twentieth century.
Although its roots go back to the employment practices of William Durant and Henry
receive their deferred compensation, the employer will have to pay them their full
compensation now to be competitive with other employers, and there will be no savings in
monitoring or in joint employer/employee human-capital investment.
31. EHRENBERG& SMITH, supra note 21, at 316; LOws LEvINE, TE WOMEN'S GARMENT
WoRKERS 25-31 (1924).
32. See EHRENBERG & SMIT, supra note 21, at 316.
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Ford in the 1910s and 1920s, 3 the paradigm of lifetime employment reached the
zenith of its reign in America during the decades just after World War II. During this
period, international competition was of small concern to most American businesses.
The United States emerged from the war as one of the few nations with its productive
capacity intact. Indeed, American manufacturing had been greatly strengthened
during the war due to government investments in technology and productive
capacity.' As a result, American manufacturing dominated world trade.35 Although
some American industries were highly competitive, many, such as the auto, steel, and
petroleum industries, settled into "comfortable" relations with their domestic
competitors.3 6 Corporate strategies for increasing profits were based or vertical
integration and growth.37 Following the lead of General Motor's William Durant,
most firms saw vertical integration of production as necessary to ensure adequate
quality and quantity of the requisite components of the finished product.3"
This environment proved fertile for the growth of lifetime employment and internal
labor markets.39 The relative security of American firms in international and domestic
competition made it easy for firms to accept the risk that fixed investments, such as
investments in employees' skills would become obsolete and made flexibility in
production methods a low priority.' Moreover, the large vertically integrated
corporate enterprises that evolved during this time lent themselves to governance by
internal labor markets. The administrative staff necessary to run the internal labor
market posed a relatively small addition to the managerial staff necessary to run these
large vertically integrated operations, while the steps of the vertical operation proved
amenable to the "career ladders" of promotion found in the internal labor market.41
Furthermore, tight labor markets in the postwar boom years encouraged employers
to try to keep and to further develop skilled employees.42 Accordingly, during this
period, lifetime employment governedby internal labor markets was viewed by many
managers and academics as the "best" management practice, at least for large
companies.43
What did the lifetime employment relationship look like during this period? As an
idealized example, we might examine the employment practices of IBM from 1950
33. CAPPELLI, supra note 3, at 54-55,60-62. Modem "progressive" management under the
administrative rules of an internal labor market replaced the "drive" method of managing
workers in which foremen yelled at, threatened, and sometimes hit workers to raise
productivity. Id. at 57.
34. HERZENBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
35. American dominance of world manufacturing is demonstrated by the fact that during
1953, American industry accounted for forty-five percent of world manufacturing output. Id.
36. Id.
37. CAPPELLI, supra note 3, at 59-60.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 75.
40. Id. at 97-98.
41. Id. at61;HERZENBERGETAL, supra note 6, at 11-12.
42. CAPPELLI, supra note 3, at 62.
43. Id. at 67; see, e.g., JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAisHA, THE JAPANESE
CORPORATiON 199-203 (1985) (discussing the Japanese system of career-long eniployment);
WLAM G. Oucmu, "ITEoRY Z (1984).
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to 1985. The concept of lifetime employment was first undertaken by IBM in the
1950s with the adoption of distinctive criteria for hiring employees.' Under the IBM
plan, specific job skills were much less important than general aptitude, teamwork
skills, and "character," because the company itselfplanned to develop the employees'
particularjob skills.45 Indeed, once hired, an employee was subjected to an extensive
training regimen that never ended during the course of his or her career.' This
training included skills training at the firm's Armonk training center, on-the-job
training in a variety of firm positions chosen for the employee's development, and
generous programs to facilitate or pay for employee training at institutions of higher
education. Everymanager's performance appraisal included employee development
as a goal.48 Because IBM was large, and had few competitors, it was relatively easy
for the corporation to develop and follow long-term business plans.49 This long-term
planning allowed IBM to develop the skills and talent it needed internally by
promoting skills development among its employees and promoting successful
employees up the corporate ladder. IBM managed demand swings internally by
shifting employees from one production process to another and was "proud of the fact
that it had never had a layoff in its forty-year history as a modem computer
company"--a fact that it advertised to all potential new hires.5' IBM was rewarded
for these efforts with a highly skilled workforce, thoroughly versed in the operations
of the firm, motivated by intemal promotions and rewards, and loyal to the company
that had undertaken to invest in and guarantee their futures.5
B. The New Age of Trade and Technology and the
Rise of Short-Term and Contingent Employment
During the last three decades of the twentieth century, the conditions that fostered
lifetime employment and internal labor markets began to change. First, international
competition became a much more important factor for most American firms. The
complete victory of the proponents of free trade, as represented in a variety of
international treaties,52 has combined with a retooled Europe and Japan and with
industrial development in previously third-world countries, to ensure that American
companies across the entire breadth of our economy now feel the pressures of
international competition.53 Indeed, the breadth of this change, in concert with a
44. CAPPELru, supra note 3, at 70.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 71.
51. Id. at72.
52. E.g., TREATY ESTABLiSHINGTHE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C340)
3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]; NAFTA, supra note 4.
53. Ansley, supra note 5, at 386-87. The first tremors along this fault line were felt with
the invasion of foreign cars in the wake of the OPEC oil embargo and price hikes of the early
1970s. Later incursions by foreign steel, apparel, and consumer electronic goods made it clear
that the foreign car imports were not a limited phefiomenon.
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growth in American consumer demand for services, has caused the transformation of
the American economy from one dominated by manufacturing to one dominated by
its service sector.' Together with the deregulation movement over the same period,
the increase in international trade in the last quarter of the twentieth century has
ensured that most American firms operate in a much more competitive environment
than they previously did.
Second, new information technology has both facilitated the movement of capital
from country to country and allowed new methods of managing firms and organizing
production that bring the market inside the firm. Increased communication and
information processing capabilities allow companies to keep track of and manage
plants and investments in other countries. The increased mobility of capital in the
international economy has meant that employees must now compete with workers in
other countries merely to retain the allegiance of their employer." The improvements
in information gathering and processing capabilities have also allowed employers to
trim midlevel management positions and devolve some management responsibilities
to lower-level employees. As a result, the managerial ranks are much leaner than in
times past and some of the past distinctions between managers and the managed have
disappeared. Furthermore, the new information technologyhas allowed employers to
collect and manage data on rivals and potential suppliers and use this information as
a "benchmark" for the performance of their own divisions and operations.' As a
result, individual departments and divisions within firms have been placed in direct
competition with their rivals in a way not previously experienced in the modem
corporation. Finally, the new information technology allows employers to collect and
manage information on the current capabilities and capacities of component suppliers
to an extent not previously possible outside a single firm. Thus, it is no longer
necessary for firms to be vertically integrated to ensure the adequate quality and
quantity of their component parts, and methods of production increasingly rely on the
subcontracting of important production work.'
The economic environment in the new age of trade and technology is much less
hospitable to internal labor markets and lifetime employment. The increased level of
competition to which firms are subject has increased the risk of fixed investments
such as employee training, and caused firms to put new emphasis on flexibility in
methods ofproduction." As the level of competition has increased, firms have tended
to focus on ever smaller areas of "core competency" in which they enjoy some
competitive advantage. With the narrowing of corporate interests, fixed investments,
such as specialized employee skills, run a greater risk of becoming useless to the
f-rmL
5 9
Moreover, with greater competition, American firms are more subject to the
dictates of the market place and want to remain flexible in order to respond to
changes in demand. As a result, firms are less amenable to accepting the risk that
54. See BORiAs, supra note 9, at 367.
55. Ansley, supra note 5, at 370-77.
56. CAPPELu, supra note 3, at 106.
57. Id. at 104.
58. Id. at 76.
59. Id. at 99-100.
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employee skills will become obsolete and to locking themselves into long-term
employment commitments.
In addition, the new information technology has allowed the reorganization of firms
in leaner ways that are internally more subject to the machinations of the market and
less integrated in their levels of production. The paring of midlevel managers from
the operations of the firms and the availability of market-oriented management
strategies such as benchmarking has made the administration necessary for internal
labor markets relatively more expensive. Why maintain a large and costly human
resources apparatus when the rest of your management tasks are being streamlined
and reoriented to the market?
Finally, the disintegration of the firm allows for the subcontracting of work to
various suppliers. Such subcontracting changes the firm'n's concerns back to payment
for product and dismantles the larger corporate enterprises that served as vehicles for
long-term careers. It is perhaps not surprising then that currently the "best"
management practices identified by managers and academics are those that focus on
flexibility and an immediate orientation to the market'
No single example demonstrates all of the many ways in which the employment
relationship is changing in the new age of trade and technology, but perhaps the most
talked about is the Volkswagen truck assembly plant in Resende, Brazil. Although
most employers usually retain at least a core of "permanent" employees,
supplementing them with temporary employees or subcontractors to handle particular
components or seasonal variations in demand,6 the Volkswagen truck plant in
Resende employs almost no permanent employees.62 Instead, truck production is
undertaken in four "modules" which are produced by four different subcontractors
within the Volkswagen plant6 3 Once employees from one subcontractor assemble the
chassis, it makes its way down the main assembly line as employees from other
subcontractors assemble and attach their components. Yellow lines on the floor of the
plant delineate the area in which each subcontractor is supposed to operate."
Volkswagen's relationship with the subcontractors runs on a quarterly basis and the
subcontractors accordingly make no commitment of long-term employment to their
employees. 5 Employees of the subcontractors earn about a third of the wage of
unionized Volkswagen workers in Sao Paulo, Brazil.' Although this "virtual
Volkswagen" plant is still somewhat unique, there are plans to emulate its system of
subcontracted modular production in the industry. General Motors is currently
engaged in negotiations to undertake subcontracted modular production at four of its
American plants, including the new Saturn plant, under its "project Yellowstone."
60. See id.
61. Id. at 136-37.
62. See Jane Slaughter, Modular Assembly: The Ultimate in 'Contracting Out' Comes to
North America, LAB.NOTES, May 1999, at 8. Actual employees of Volkswagen merely manage
the facility and undertake quality inspections. CAPPELU, supra note 3, at 104.
63. Slaughter, supra note 62, at 8.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
[Vol. 76:1
EMPLOYMENT IN THE NEW AGE
m. IMPUCATIONS OF THE NEW AGE OF TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY
FOR LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Not every worker will experience the changes in the employment relationship I
have outlined above. Even employers who replace permanent employees with
temporary employees and subcontractors or adopt new market-oriented methods of
management, commonly retain a core of "permanent" employees, especially among
their high-skilled or managerial workers. Moreover, many workers, especially
unskilled low-wage workers, have never enjoyed the benefits of internal labor
markets and lifetime employment." Indeed, because of the inadequacy of our data on
temporary workers and subcontractors there has been a fair amount of controversy
among academics about the number of employees who have been directly affected by
these changes."9
Nevertheless, as in economics, where it is the marginal worker who determines the
wage and conditions of employment,7 0 so too in law is it the marginal worker, the one
whose legal status might change or is changing, who determines the current legal
issues to be addressed by the legislatures and the courts. There is no doubt that
lifetime employment relationships have ceded ground to short-term employment
relationships in the American economy and that the market has been interjected into
the employment relationship in a way not experienced in the recent past. What do
these changes mean for us in our efforts to address the current needs of employers
and employees through labor and employment law?
The short answer is that, as the paradigm of lifetime employment under an internal
labor market recedes, all of the problems of the employment relationship that this
paradigm addressed will once again come to the forefront of the employment
relationship and labor and employment law. As turnover rates increase with the rise
of contingent employment finms will place new emphasis on finding ways to evaluate
the potential productivity of new hires. These efforts will undoubtedly raise issues in
the conflict between employers' need for information and employees' right to
privacy, including questions about defamation and the proper use of employee
references.7 Similarly, as the employment relationship shortens and wages become
68. A variety of economists have done theoretical and empirical work on the basis of a
"dual" or "segmented" labor market that treats low-wage and high-wage workers differently.
E.g., Glen G. Cain, The Challenge ofSegmented Labor Market Theories to Orthodox Theory:
A Survey, 14 L ECON. LITERATURE 1215 (1976); Paul Taubman & Michael L. Wachter,
SegmentedLaborMarkets, in 2 HANDBOOKOFLABORECONOMICS 1183 (Orley Ashenfelter &
Richard Layard eds., 1986).
69. See RICHARD S. BELOUs, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE
TEMPORARY, PART-TIMEAND SUBCONTRACTEDWORKFORCE 15-17 (1989); Ame L. Kalleberg,
Part-Time Workand Workers in the United States: Correlates and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. &
LEEL. REv. 771,771 (1995).
70. BORJAS, supra note 9, at 106-09.
71. Consistent with this analysis, employer efforts to test prospective employees for various
characteristics including psychological strengths or defects, honesty, drug use, and medical
conditions, are also booming. E.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123
(Alaska 1989) (drug use); Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (honesty, psychological defects); see also, Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy,
2001]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
more closely tied with the employee's current product, employers will strive to find
new ways to monitor employees on the job. These efforts will also bring employers
in conflict with employees' right to privacy. Moreover, as employees move from one
employer to another over the course of their careers, employers will be less willing
to finance employee training. Society will have to find new ways to ensure that
employees can obtain the requisite skills. As workers' paybecomes more directly tied
to current productivity, employers will be less likely to offer benefits that maintain
employees during times of decreased productivity. Society will have to readdress
existing public programs or find new ways to ensure that employees can maintain
themselves and their families during times of slack demand, infirmity, and retirement.
Finally, as employees become more transient they will become harder to organize and
less likely to address public goods in the workplace. Society will have to find new
ways to encourage workplace democracy and give expression to employees'
collective voice. What does the above analysis tell us about how we should address
these issues?
One central conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that remedies that
attempt to adapt the parties and the employment relationship to the new information
technology and global economy will be more successful than those that attempt to
resist these changes. The underlying causes of the changes in the employment
relationship that I have identified are not passing fads, but instead constitute
fundamental changes in our economy. Employers are not going to forget how to use
the new information technology and it seems extremely unlikely that efforts to restrict
how that technology canbe used would be popular or successful. Similarly, although
in the future there may be the occasional small retreat from international free trade
as the nation-state grapples with international business to maintain the rule of law,'
the march toward a global economy in manufactured goods and even many services
seems relentless. Accordingly, it would be best to find solutions to the above
problems that were consistent with or made use of the new information technology
or global trade. What might some of those solutions be?
A. Adapting Labor and Employment Law
to the New Information Technology
The central insight of my analysis is that labor and employment law should attempt
to encourage the use of the new information technology to address the problems I
have identified. In other words, we should use the new information technology to
build relationships among workers and employers that aid the flow of accurate
information and references among employees and employers, that promote employee
training over employees' careers, that allow for employee benefits across multiple
employers, and that facilitate the expression of employees' collective voice to their
employers. Some might wonder why we should not just leave these tasks to the
marketplace. After all, if employers can use the new information technology to ensure
the availability of the right quality and quantity of car parts, why can't they use it to
American Values, and the Law, 72 CM.-KENT L. REV. 221 (1996) (medical conditions, drug
use, psychological strengths/defects).
72. See generally infra Part.III.B.
[Vol. 76:1
EMPLOYMENT IN THE NEW AGE 1
ensure the availability of the right quality and quantity of labor? As we will see, there
are various market failures, primarilypublic-good problems among employers, in the
development of skilled employees thatprevent this simple market solution and require
the intervention of labor and employment law. I turn now to the question of how can
we apply the new information technology to address some of the identified problems.
1. Employee Job References
The decline of lifetime employment has fostered an intense interest among
employers in finding cheap and accurate information about the likely productivity of
potential employees. In the modem equivalent of the "shape-up,"73 employers poke
andprod potential employees, administering psychological profile tests, honestytests,
drug tests, and, with literal poking and prodding, medical exams. A potentially very
useful source of information in this process would be accurate references on the
employees' work for past employers. Both employers and employees have an interest
in the production of accurate references to facilitate the "matching" of employees to
appropriate work.7' The possibility of effective references also gives employees an
additional incentive to be productive, even in short-term employment. 5
Unfortunately, although, virtually all employers ask for past job references, a recent
surveyby the Society for Human Resource Management found that over sixtypercent
refuse to give such information to other employers.76
The problem, of course, is that employers fear liability from defamation suits by
past employees over less than glowing references.' Although employers enjoy a
privilege from defamation in their communication of job references to other
employers, 8 this privilege is qualified and can be lost if it is "abused" by "over-
73. A "shape-up" is a method of selecting employees for a day's work by collecting them
in a line in front of the hiring boss so that he can pass down the line and assess their physical
attributes. The boss then selects those who appear the fittest for the job. The shape-up is
identified with the past of the long-shoring industry, but undoubtedly occurs in other industries
and continues to occur up to this day. WERSTER'SNEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1057 (9th ed.
1983).
74. J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation ofEmployment Reference Practices, 65 U. CuI.
L. REv. 115, 138-40 (1998) (discussing mismatching resulting from employer difficulties in
learning relevant information about employees).
75. Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willbom, Employer ar)rationality and the Demise
of Employment References, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 123, 126 (1992).
76. Frances A. McMorris, Some Firms Less Guarded in Sharing Job References, ARIZ.
REPUBUC/PHOENiX GAZETTE, July 15, 1996, at E4.
77. There also is potential liability in "wrongful referral" suits for overly generous
references. E.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 593 (Cal. 1997).
Contra Moorev. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990);"
Cohen v. Wales, 518 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
78. Employers are privileged in their communications concerning the quality of work of
an employee among people who have a "special need to know" because they are engaged in
a "common enterprise." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 (1977) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]. This privilege includes other employees in the firm as well as other employers
who are looking for choice employees. E.g., Zinda v. La. Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 552,552-53
(Wis. 1989); Hett v. Ploetz, 121 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Wis. 1963).
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publication" '79 or "knowingly or recklessly" making false and defamatory statements
about the employee."0 In recent years there seems to have been an increase in the
number of law suits finding that employers had abused the privilege, and as a result,
more employers have declined to give references.8 In response to this decline in
employer references, many states have passed new laws designed to strengthen and
reinvigorate the employers' privilege.82
However, it is not clear that employer fear of defamation liability is such a bad
thing. After all, it is accurate employee references that are valuable in the market, and,
at least on its face, the old standard for abuse of the privilege, "recklessness," does
not seem unduly burdensome on employers. Indeed, given the fact that most
employees never know what their references are from past employers, it would be
surprising if the real problem in the decline of employer references was an excess of
defamation liability. State statutes that strengthen the employers' privilege only serve
to further suppress an already inadequate level of defamation liability from
sufficiently policing the veracity of employer references. The real problem is that,
given any level ofpotential defamation liability, employer references dry up because
there are potential costs to the reference-granting employer of making a reference, but
no benefits. The shared information the employers could enjoy from a universal
system ofreferences poses a classic public-good problem.8" Why should an employer
give a reference and take any risk of defamation liability when he cannot compel
other employers to give him references, and thus gets nothing in return?
The solution is for states to encourage employers to use the new information
technology to create reference pools which all participating employers can access
with the permission of job applicants. Once established, employers would see
benefits from participating and giving job references because they would be sure of
receiving useful employee references in return. Although difficulties in pricing such
reference information generally prevent private intermediaries from setting up such
pools," if local government undertook the initiative to set up or encourage such pools
79. "Over-publication" occurs when the employer communicates the information to people
outside of the common interest, or for reasons that do not further the common interest.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, §§ 603-605A, 605 cmt. a; see also Zinda, 440 N.W.2d at 553-
54.
80. Zinda, 440 N.W.2d at 553; RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, §§ 600, 602,605 cmt. a.
81. David C. Martin & Kathryn M. Bartol, Potential Libel and Slander Issues Involving
Discharged Employees, 13 EMPLOYEE REL L.J. 43, 44 (1987); Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the
Laws Governing Employment References: Problems of "Overdeterrence "and a Proposalfor
Reform, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 45, 45-46 (1995).
82. At last count twenty-six states had passed such laws. Alex B. Long, Note, Addressing
the Cloud over Employee References: A Survey ofRecently Enacted State Legislation, 39 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 177, 177 (1997).
83. A public good is a good, such as a park or commons, from which people who do not
contribute to the good cannot be excluded from consuming the good. As a result, people do not
contribute to consume the good and too little of the good is produced. ROBERT H. FRANK,
MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAViOR, 606-07 (1991).
84. Verkerke, supra note 74, at 171-72. If the private intermediary pays a flat amount for
references, he gives incentive for employers to only give references when they are good or
innocuous, and he poses no threat of defamation liability. If the intermediary pays more for
valuable "bad" references, he gives incentives for employers to give inaccurate or "bad"
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and state governments passed some simple rules for their governance, this would
greatly facilitate employers' ability to set up and run such organizations."5 The state
laws that would be necessary would be laws that allow such pools to punish members
who do not cooperate or who supply inadequate information, laws to prevent the
abuse of such power, and laws to make it clear that exchanges of information within
the reference pool should be treated the same as exchanges within a single fin for
the purposes of defamation liability. 6 Under such an arrangement, area employers
would become like one or several big employers for the purposes of sharing
information on employees' job performance. State law could also add a right on the
part of the employee to view his employment file on record with the reference pool
and to correct any erroneous information: a right similar to the right of creditors to
view and correct their credit rating under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.87 In the
interests of providing full and accurate information. the review and correction
procedure could allow for arbitration of the disputed facts so that prospective
employers arenotjust left with two conflicting accounts of an employee's departure
from a firm when deciding whether to hire the prospective employee.8 If a state
wanted to further empower employees, it could also maintain Internet accessible
pools of employee experiences with employers, governed by the law of defamation,
or it could foster the development of such employer reference pools by unions, with
the grant of a qualified privilege against defamation to unions. After all, employees
have an interest in accurate information on prospective employers just as employers
have an interest in accurate information on prospective employees.
references. Accordingly, such intermediaries are rare except for situations in which references
are extremely important to the hiring decision. Id. at 171-73. A reciprocal reference exchange
program avoids pricing references and so avoids this problem.
85. State governments may even want to compel employer membership and the disclosure
of information in some cases: for example, truck drivers who were discharged for drunk
driving. Id. at 163.
86. Existing legal doctrine in most states extending the employer's qualified privilege to
other employers who receive employee references would already suffice to achieve this last
function. See, e.g., Zinda v. La. Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Wis. 1989).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g, 1681 i (1994). Such an arrangement may cause employers to rein
in references on bad employees, but even terse references such as "the employee was fired"
would communicate needed information to prospective employers without being defamatory.
Moreover, employee access to the files would improve accuracy in some cases and not leave
individual workers at the mercy of more powerful employers acting, with the state's
encouragement, in concert.
88. I added the possibility ofarbitrating reference disputes to my proposal at the suggestion
ofProfessor Matthew W. Finkin, who gave me this suggestion and other useful comments after
reading this article. For further elaboration on the desirability and feasibility of reference
arbitration and other thoughts by Finkin on the problems ofworkforce screening, see Matthew
W. Finkin, FromAnonymityto Transparence: Screening the Workforce in the Information Age,
2000 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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2. Employee Training
The decline of lifetime employment and the vertical disintegration of firms have
also undermined employer-sponsored training. Although the demands for skills in
employment have only increased, in recent years real employer expenditures on
training per worker have actually decreased. 9 Moreover, this decrease has been
greatest for entry-level employees and low-skill employees.' This is bad news given
the importance of employer-provided training to the training of American workers
and the importance of training in general to the maintenance of American earning
potential in a global economy.91 Some employers have adopted a conscious strategy
of raiding other employers for skilled employees, rather than training their own. 2 As
this practice suggests, lower levels of employer-provided training are not just bad for
American workers, but also bad for American employers. The new higher rates ofjob
mobility among the American workforce have meant that it has been hard for
employers to retain high-skilled workers even if they train them.93
The problem is that once the bonds of long-term employment are broken, employer
sponsored training in general skills becomes a public good, or even worse, a potential
liability if the employee leaves with trade secrets and employer sponsored training in
employer-specific skills becomes apotential waste. Why should an employerprovide
valuable training to temporary employees who will only end up working for someone
else? The loose connection of employees to their employer in the new age of trade
and technology encourages employers to raid other employers for skilled workers,
free riding off of any training efforts of the original employer. Moreover, the vertical
disintegration of firms has destroyed the old career paths that were the underlying
structure for employer-sponsored training.94 Even ifan employer wanted to undertake
on-the-j ob training, many of thejobs that made up the natural progression from entry-
level employee to skilled employee or manager are now assigned to some
subcontractor and are outside the employer's immediate control.
Some employers have attempted to address this problem, at least for high-skilled
workers who might leave of their own accord, through resort to traditional actions in
contract and tort. Covenants not to compete are becoming increasingly popular for
employees who have valuable skills or access to important customers or trade
secrets.9 Such covenants are generally enforceable only if they are reasonable in
scope and serve some legitimate interest of the employer.' Suits against former
89. LAURIE J. BAsSI ET AL, THE ASTD TRAINING DATA BOOK 3 (1996); CAPPELII, supra
note 3, at 152.
90. See CAPPELU, supra note 3, at 153; JILL M. CONSTANTINE & DAVID NEUMARK,
TRAININGAND THE GROWTHOFWAGE INEQUAUTY (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 4729, 1994).
91. See generally infra notes 147-65 and accompanying text.
92. HERZENBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 124.
93. See CAPPELU, supra note 3, at 44-45.
94. HERZENBERGETAL., supra note 6, at 123.
95. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE BY STATE SURVEY (P. Jerome Richey et al.
eds., 1991).
96. ALvIN L. GOLDMAN, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 97-98
(1996). In my own experience I have found that employers generally write covenants not to
[Vol. 76:1
EMPLOYMENT IN THE NEWAGE
employees for the appropriation of trade secrets also seem in vogue.97 Although
former employees are allowed to use general information and skills acquired during
employment in later jobs, they are not allowed to appropriate the value of employer
trade secrets which are not readily available to other members of the industry.98
Employers have also developed what I believe to be a relatively new contractual
provision requiring employees who receive training either to stay with the employer
for a set term, or to reimburse the employer for all or part of their training upon
departure. At this time, the enforceability of such provisions is questionable. 9
Employer efforts to address the problem through resort to traditional actions in
contract and tort are inadequate for the problem. Individual suits in contract and tort
would seem a costly and awkward way to protect a program of employer-sponsored
training. Moreover, given the justifiably strong presumption in favor of the mobility
of labor in our law and the inadequacy of most employees' resources to repay training
costs, it seems doubtful that the problem can be successfully solved by legally
binding select employees to the employer. Besides, what about the lesser-skilled and
entry-level employees? Even if employers are successful in using contract and tort
actions to bind high-skilled people that they have trained for the job, this program
does nothing to promote employer training of low-skilled and entry-level employees.
A better solution would be for federal or state government to undertake to develop
new multiemployer training programs that utilize the new information technology to
coordinate employees' careers among multiple employers."° The government could
solve the problem of employers free riding on other employers' training efforts by
levying a modest payroll tax to finance the programs.' Several other countries
already require employers to spend a percentage of payroll on training, perhaps to
solve this same problem. 2 Employers could be clustered in the training program
compete that are niuch broader than the legitimate interest they have to protect. The problem
ofcourse is that employees maythink they are bound by these overbroad covenants even ifthey
are unenforceable in the courts. Accordingly, I subscribe to the theory propounded by some
courts that covenants not to compete should be completely void if they are written in such a
way that they are clearly overbroad, so as to deter employers from writing overbroad covenants
and taking advantage of employees' uncertainty as to their enforceability.
97. See, e.g., Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1989). Indeed -the
problem has captured the attention of Congress and prompted the passage of the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (Supp. IV 1998).
98. GOLDMm, supra note 96, at 95; see, e.g., K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471,
474 (9th Cir. 1974); cf Michael A. Epstein & Stuart D. Levi, Protecting Trade Secret
Information: A Planfor Proactive Strategy, 43 Bus. LAW. 887 (1988).
99. In the only reported case to date, the court refused to enforce such a provision because
the employee owed more for the training than its apparent worth. Brunner v. Hand Indus., Inc.,
603 N.E.2d 157, 160-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). The court also made a more sweeping
condemnation ofsuch provisions emphasizing that a worker who quit soon after training could
end up owing more than he would have earned while employed. Id. at 161. For this reason,
such provisions may also run afoul of the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum-pay provisions.
Alvin L. Goldman, Potential Refinements of Employment Relations in the 21st Century, 3
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. REL PUB. POL'Y J. 269, 272 (1999).
100. See HERZENBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 150, 158.
101. Id. at 161.
102. Id. (citing OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, WORKER TRANIG:
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according to the types of skills they need and can produce, to set up a logical
progression of training and to promote employees across the cluster. These clusters
could also serve as a basic building block for grouping employers for the reference
pools discussed in the previous section.0 3 Coordinating portable benefitplans across
employers would also be an important part of career progression in the training
program' Such multiemployer training programs would provide much needed
employee training and allow employees to undertake multiemployer career paths with
benefits and logical promotions in skills and jobs in much the same way as they did
under the old paradigm of lifetime employment.'
0 5
3. Employee Collective Voice
The new age of trade and technology has not been conducive to the expression of
employees' collective voice. Indeed, although there are other factors at play,"° it
seems fair to say that the globalization of the economy and the decline of lifetime
employment and internal labor markets have been driving forces behind the decline
of unions in the-United States.' Foreign competition has taken many of our
manufacturing jobs-the bedrock of the American labor movement-overseas,
converting our economy to one dominated by the service sector.' Many of the jobs
that remain operate in a much more competitive environment that is not conducive to
unionization."° Unions that functioned well in enforcing long-term promises in the
administrative bureaucracy of the internal labor market struggle to find a role for
themselves in the new market environment. Transient employees who operate in a
spot labor market are much harder to organize than lifetime employees. Not only are
they easier for employers to replace, but because they have little expectation of
working long for the same employer, they have little incentive to invest time or
energy in public goods such as union organization or collective voice. "o Moreover,
the devolution of managerial responsibility that has occurred with the new
IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 94 (1990)).
103. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
104. See HERZENBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 161.
105. Several models for such multiemployer training programs already exist. Employer-
union coalitions have already taken the initial steps at developing community career ladders
in Madison, Wisconsin, and Hyannis, Massachusetts, in a variety of industries including health
care, insurance, and manufacturing. Id. at 126-28.
106. A variety of reasons have been given for the decline of unions in the United States,
including: the decline of the manufacturing sector in the United States, the increase in women
as a percent of the labor force, and the increase in employer recalcitrance towards unions,
FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 12, at 221-45, as well as increased competitiveness in many
markets due to international trade and deregulation, the decline of long-term employment, and
a decline in government support for unions that began with President Reagan's busting of the
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization ("PATCO') strike. Barry T. Hirsch, The
Dunlop Commission's Premise: A Tilted Playing Field?, 17 J. LAB. RES. 15, 21-26 (1996).
107. Hirsch, supra note 106, at 21-26; cf FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 12, at 221-45.
108. See Hirsch, supra note 106, at 19-21.
109. Unions tend to organize employees in industries that enjoy some measure ofmonopoly
power in the product market. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 14, at 469.
110. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 27, at 694.
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information technology has left more and more employees within the broad
definitions of supervisory and managerial employees under the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act"),"' and so outside of the protections of the Act."'
As a result, the percent of workers organized in the private sector in the United States
has dropped from roughly seventeen percent to about ten percent since the early
1980s."
3
Nevertheless, there remains a need for employees' collective voice in the
workplace. As previously discussed, many of the conditions of the workplace are
public goods including the quality of the air, light, speed of the assembly line, and
perhaps even the hours of work." 4 In order to negotiate efficient terms with the
employer withrespect to suchpublic goods, it is necessarythat the employees address
the employer with a collective voice."5 Employees also have useful insights into the
operation of the plant. Several recent management techniques, for example "Quality
Circles," are predicated on the idea that employees have useful information to
contribute in determining how best to undertake production."6 Although employers
can gain information on how to improve production from individual employees, a
collective voice for employees may also facilitate such discussions. Employee
collective voice has also proved useful in the enforcement of government regulatory
schemes, for example OSHA." 7 Furthermore, the idea of industrial democracy still
holds a philosophical appeal."' If capital is organized in its representation in the
workplace, why shouldn't laborbe organized? Recent efforts by employers to weaken
the restrictions of section 8(a)(2) ofthe NLRA through litigation and legislation stand
as a testament to the continuing need for an employee collective voice in the
workplace." 9 How can we best meet this need in the new economic environment?
There has been a long standing chorus of calls from academics for reform of the
NLRA. 20 It has been persuasively argued that the provisions of the NLRA, at least
as currently interpreted by the courts, do not present a legal environment that is
conducive to organization.' The court decisions that have been identified as limiting
111. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
112. See, e.g., NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. ofAm., 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
113. Hirsch, supra note 106, at 20.
114. See supra note 83.
115. FREEMAN &MEDOFF, supra note 12, at 8-9.
116. See Dau-Schnidt, supra note 14, at 470.
117. David Weil, Are Mandated Health and Safety Committee Substitutes for or
Supplements to Labor Unions?, 52 INDUs. & LAB. REL REv. 339, 340 (1999).
118. See Goldman, supra note 99, at 303.
119. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 14, at 470-71.
120. E.g., Charles B. Craver, TheNationalLaborRelationsActMustBeRevisedto Preserve
Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397 (1992); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair,
Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59,
61-68 (1993); William B. Gould IV, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor
Relations Act: The Need for Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REv. 937
(1986); Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda forLegal
Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 1 (1988); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
121. Goldman, supra note 99, at 284.
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union representation include those allowing employers to tell workers that the
business will close if the workers exercise their right to choose a collective
representative;" allowing employers to permanently replace striking employees
regardless ofanynecessity to do so; permitting workers to remove themselves from
the jurisdictional authority of the elected representative;" delineating broad
definitions of managerial and supervisory employees so as to exclude from the
coverage of the Act any employee with even modest managerial responsibilities;125
and permitting new owners to avoid current labor contract obligations and collective
bargaining obligations. 6 It has also been persuasively argued that the Act's remedial
penalties are too low to adequately deter employers from committing unfair labor
practices; 27 that the Act's election procedures should be eliminated or streamlined
so as to deny employers opportunity to commit unfair labor practices; ' and that first-
time contract negotiations should be subject to interest arbitration to improve the
chances of the parties achieving a first contract."" Although reform of the NLRA
would undoubtedly facilitate union representation in the private sector, even with
such reform it seems unlikely that traditional NLRA-style unions will ever represent
the vast majority of Anierican private-sector employees under the current economic
environment.
°30
Commentators have identified more creative alternatives for promoting employee
collective voice. Several have supported amending section 8(a)(2) to allow employer
sponsored committees;' 3 ' although some would require employee election of such
committees 32 or limit their operation to cases in which there was not a current
organizing effort byan independent union. 3 3 Professor Matthew Finkin has proposed
that we explore the use of minority representation as a means of broadening the reach
of collective bargaining in our. country. "M Under this proposal, unions could achieve
122. Id. (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), and Textile Workers
Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965)).
123. Id. (citing Trans World Airlines v. Indep. Fed'n of Fligfit Attendants, 489 U.S. 426
(1989), and Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983)).
124. Id. (citing Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), and Pattern Makers'
League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985)).
125. Id. (citing NLRB v. Healthcare & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571 (1994), and NLRB
v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980)).
126. Id. (citing Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974)).
127. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 14, at 508.
128. Weiler, supra note 120, at 1776-1805.
129. Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for
Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 405-12 (1984).
130. Gottesman, supra note 120, at 61.
131. Craver, supra note 120, at 429-31; Gottesman, supra note 120, at 86; Clyde W.
Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception to Section 8(a)(2),
69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 141 (1993); see also Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a
World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3, 20-22, 25-26 (1993).
132. Charles J. Morris, Will There Be a New Direction for American Industrial
Relations?-A Hard Look at the Team Bill, the Sawyer Substitute Bill, and the Employee
Involvement Bill, 47 LAn. L.J. 89 app. B at 105-107-(1996).
133. Gottesman, supra note 120, at 86-87.
134. Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority Employee
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bargaining rights in a workplace merely by gaining the allegiance of a significant
minority of the employees.'35 At this symposium, Michael Harper makes a very
interesting proposal for a two-tiered system of employee representation in which
unions can achieve alimited representational status through an abbreviated employee-
selection procedure without employer input or resistance, and full representational
rights through a more traditional election procedure.136 Others have suggested
importing the German idea of co-determination into American industrial relations.'
Under these proposals, in workplaces with some minimum number of employees, the
government would mandate the election of employees to "Employee Participation
Committees," which would collect information from the employer and consult with
him or her on certain designated issues.' More ambitious proposals also call for
employee representation on the board of directors. 39 Finally, Michael Gottesman has
suggested that, in the absence of collective bargaining, we imbue individual
employees with many of the rights traditionally associated with the collective
bargaining system including protection from employer reprisal, access to employer
information concerning bargaining issues, and the ability to compel the employer to
bargain in good faith. 4 Gottesman would rely on employee representation on the
board of directors, employee stock 6wnership, and mandatory interest arbitration to
give employees "leverage" in negotiations.'
Among these proposals, the ones that seem the most compatible with the new age
oftrade and technology are Harper's proposal fortwo-tiered representation, Finkin's
proposal for minority representation, and Weiler's proposals for employee
representation on participation committees and corporate boards of directors. 4 2 The
two-tiered representation and minority representation proposals would ease unions'
obstacles in organizing across occupations to provide continuity for employees in
multiemployer careers. Although limited and minority representation may not pose
a powerful bargaining force in the workplace, it can still act as a collective voice for
employees in workplace concerns andprovide services to members such as references
and benefit plans. Among western industrialized countries, the United States is
unique in its insistence on the selection of an exclusive majority representative in
Representation, 69 CM.-KENT L. REV. 195 (1993).
135. Id.
136. Michael C. Harper, A Framework for the Rejuvenation of the American Labor
Movement, 76 IND. L.J. 103, 124-28 (2001).
137. PAuL C. WEaILER, GOvERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 284 (1990); Goldman, supra note 99, at 296-97.
138. WEU.ER, supra note 137, at 284-95.
139. Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Coope-ation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 936-65 (1993).
140. Gottesman, supra note 120, at 71-85.
141. Id. at 93-96.
142. Proposals to enhance individual bargaining, although perhaps laudable in themselves,
do not solve the public-good problem that makes the collective voice necessary. Proposals for
employee stock ownership may also be laudable as encouraging saving and promoting unity
of interest between employers and employees, but they seem doubtful as a means of giving
current employees a voice in the workplace since employee mobility fromjob to job may mean
employees own more stock in past employers than their current employer.
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collective bargaining through a full-fledged election proceeding.""
Employee-participation committees and employee representation on corporate
boards of directors also provide a forum for collective voice that is consistent with
the fast-paced changes of the modem labor market. Although the new pace of change
in the workplace may be too fast to be conducive to traditional organizing, there
seems no practical reason why large corporations could not be required to conduct
periodic elections among their employees for employee representatives on
participation committees and the corporation's board of directors. Although such
employee participation committees would not conduct full collective bargaining, they
could serve as a useful source of information for employees and employers.
Moreover, they could facilitate collective bargaining in units in which independent
unions existed and facilitate the enforcement of a variety of regulatory schemes.
Indeed, to date over twenty states have experimented in some way with mandated
employee health and safety committees in the enforcement of OSHA regulations.'"
Unions can aid their cause in the new age of trade and technologyby adapting their
organizing strategies and functions to account for the changed economic landscape.
Since in the new age, employees are more connected to their careers than individual
employers, unions should undertake organizing more on an occupational basis than
an employer basis. Moreover, unions can appeal to employees by acting as a source
ofcontinuity for employees throughout their multiemployer careers. This can be done
by participating in the employer and employee reference pools and multiemployer
training programs discussed in previous sections.'45 Unions can provide further
continuity by engaging in multiemployer bargaining to act as the prime administrator
of multiemployer benefit plans. This multiemployer approach to employee services
has been used for decades by unions in industries where multiemployer careers have
long been common, such as the building trades." 6 The labor movement needs to adapt
the lessons learned in these industries to other industries where multiemployer careers
are now more common.
B. Adapting Labor and Employment Law
to the New Global Economy
Although the new information technology poses some challenging issues for labor
and employment law, the real challenge in the new age of trade and technology will
be to adapt labor and employment law to the global economy. The globalization of
the economy has not only wrought fundamental changes in the employment
relationship, it has substantially diminished the regulatorypower of individual nation-
states and so challenged conventional notions of state sovereignty. 47 Unfortunately
143. SeegenerallyINTERNATIoNALANDCoMPARATivEEMPLoYMENTRELArIoNs: ASTUDY
OF INDUSTRIALSED MARKET ECONOMIES (Greg J. Bamber & Russell D. Lansburyeds., 3rd ed.
1998) (discussing employment relations in ten industrialized countries).
144. Weil, supra note 117, at 345. In Washington, state regulations requiring employee
health and safety committees go back to 1945, predating OSHA. Other notable programs can
be found in Oregon and Alaska. Id.
145. See supra Part III.A.2.
146. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 508-09 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d. ed. 1992).
147. This diminished regulatory power of individual nation-states undermines state
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my analysis suggests no answers to this challenge, instead it just presents the
problem.
The problem of course is that the increased mobility of capital in a global economy
undermines the ability of individual nation-states to regulate employers. If a country
regulates the employment relationship in such a way as to impose costs on capital,
this gives the employer incentive to move his operations to a country that does not
impose such costs. As a result countries have incentive to minimize their regulation
of employers, a result known as the "race to the bottom."'48 A fact that is sometimes
overlooked in the analysis of this problem is that these incentives to avoid regulation
exist regardless of the economic efficiency of the regulation and the motives of the
employer. 49 For example, suppose that both American and Mexican workers do not
understand how dangerous it is for them to work with a chemical compound and
consequently, neither requires adequate compensating wages for this risk. Moreover,
the cancer the compound causes can occur over a long period of time after exposure
and is not solely identified with chemical exposure so that making it difficult to trace
cases back to the job under the workers' compensation system. If OSHA were to
make an efficient decision to ban the use of the compound in favor of a safer but
more expensive compound,15 ° and Mexican authorities did not impose a similar ban
on their manufacturers, employers who use the compound would have incentive to
move their operations to Mexico. Moreover, even if an American employer were
relieved by the ban on the substance because he had no desire to needlessly expose
his workers to carcinogens, if the employer remained in the United States, the
regulation would put him at a competitive disadvantage relative to manufacturers in
Mexico. '5 The question then is how can a nation assert itself, rightly or wrongly, and
govern the employment relationship in a global economy?
There currently seem to be four basic strategies at play among nations as means to
govern the employment relationship in the global economy. Each strategy has its
own advantages and disadvantages. The first, and perhaps most straightforward
method, is to agree with one's primary trading partners on a treaty that establishes
rules governing the conduct of industrial relations that preempt national law. An
example of such transnational preemptive regulation would be the European Social
Charter. 53 The Charter contains a list of fundamental social rights of workers,
including occupational health and safety protections, guarantees of the right to
sovereignty in the traditional sense both because the individual state is less able to regulate
activities within its borders, and also because effective international regulation of a problem
will necessitate accommodation of other states' interests. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 988-89 (1995).
148. Id. at 992-93.
149. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 27, at 697.
150. This decision would be "efficient" if the benefits of banning the compound in the form
of saved health costs outweighed the increased costs to manufacturing of using the substitute
compound.
151. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 27, at 697.
152. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 147, at 989-90.
153. European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into force Feb. 26,
1965).
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organize and bargain collectively, rights to adequate social welfare benefits, rights to
workplace consultation, andprotection of children, olderworkers, and the disabled. "
Such provisions then become enforceable in each of the signatory countries as a
matter of law. Such direct preemptive transnational regulation has the advantage that
it can give employees specific legal rights across a broad collection of countries. As
one can imagine though, it is often hard for countries to achieve consensus on the
standards that should be applicable in all countries, and such standards can become
weak and overgeneralized in negotiations. However, the success of the European
Union shows that broad transnational preemptive regulation is possible under some
circumstances.
155
The second method, closely related to the first, is that a country may try to agree
with its trading partners on a treaty that establishes certain minimum standards for all
signatories for the regulation of industrial relations, and then each country agrees to
"harmonize" their laws to meet these standards within a specified time." The
protected rights then become enforceable in the manner prescribed in each country's
harmonizing laws. An example of such an arrangement would be European Union
directives under the Maastrict Treaty,"s including the 1994 directive requiring works
councils or other consultive procedures in all European multinational corporations.158
The advantages and disadvantages of this method of harmonization are much the
same as preemptive transnational regulation, except that the process of harmonization
allows more individual variation among countries as to how the agreed-upon
legislative objectives are realized. 59
A third strategy is for a country to search out trading partners who have
"acceptable" standards for the regulation of the employment relation, and restrict free
trade agreements to just those countries. A country, like the United States, with
sufficiently attractive consumer markets, can use this strategy to encourage other
potential trading partners to bring their labor standards up to par with those of the
consumer country. A variety of U.S. trade laws allow the President to withhold trade
privileges from other countries that do not give their workers certain basic
protections, including the right to organize."6 Ostensibly this was the theory behind
154. Id. at 92-95.
155. Although initially a hold out on the Social Charter, Great Britain has recently agreed
to its terms. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Labor Law and Industrial Peace: A Comparative
Analysis ofthe United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan Under the Bargaining
Model, 8 TUL J. OF INT'L & CoMI'. L. 117, 138 (2000); 1 R. Schackleton, IndustrialRelations
Reform in Britain Since 1979, 19 J. LAB. RES. 581, 600-01 (1998).
156. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 147, at 1001.
157. EC TREATY, supra note 52.
158. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 147, at 1002-03.
159. Id. at 1023.
160. Id. at 1018-19. These laws include the 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative, Pub. L. No. 95-
67,97 Stat. 384 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1994)); Generalized System
of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3018, 3018-24 (amending
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901, 2903 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998)); and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-204, 99 Stat. 1669 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
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the undertaking of NAFTA. However, little effort was made to equalize or establish
a minimum floor of labor standards and labor rights among the three countries that
are party to NAFTA." Of course the country that seeks to impose higher labor
standards on a trading partner may worry that the converting country will not
adequately enforce the new laws, and may ask to monitor enforcement of these laws
and to have some recourse for complaints concerning enforcement. 62 This approach
can be appealing for powerful consumer countries that want to maintain their labor
standards while trading with lesser-developed countries. However, monitoring
enforcement of labor standards in other countries that may not be committed to the
same ideals may be problematic.
The final strategy that countries, or their citizens, have adopted to enforce labor
standards across nations is the extraterritorial application of a countries' labor and
employment laws. Although traditionally American courts have presumed that U.S.
laws do not apply extraterritorially unless they expressly state otherwise,"c more
recently there have been departures from this presumption, at least with respect to
commercial law.' Although the courts remain hesitant to applyAmerican labor and
employment laws extraterritorially, recent cases show some softening on the issue
since the stated rationale for denying application has changed from a presumption of
statutory construction to an application of international comity.'65 On the legislative
front, Congress has recently expressly provided for the extraterritorial application of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Civil Rights Act to U.S.
corporations employing U.S. workers overseas, and even considered extraterritorial
application of the NLRA.'"
Undoubtedly the nations of the world will utilize all of these strategies, and more,
in constructing an international regulatory response to the global economy. A country
like the United States, which has a very large and attractive consumer market, could
have a lot of influence in the formulation of international industrial-relations policy
if it were to assert its will. Perhaps in'the future, as the importance of international
trade grows, the United States will find the political will to take more of a leadership
role in this regard.
161. The NAFTA labor side agreement merely addresses the enforcement of each country's
existing labor laws with respect to safety and health, child labor, and minimum wages. No
effort was made to force new legislation in any country. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 147, at
1008.
162. The NAFTA labor side agreement allows each country to undertake cross-border
enforcement procedures before a Commission for Labor Cooperation, an Evaluation Committee
of Experts, and ultimately an arbitrator. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 147, at 1008-09.
163. FoleyBros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347,356-57 (1909), overruling recognized by W.S. Kirkpatrick& Co. v. Envtl.
Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
164. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
165. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
166. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 147, at 1018.
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CONCLUSION
The new age of trade and technology has wrought fundamental changes in
employment relationships in the United States. Free trade agreements combine with
improvements in information technology to place American workers in competition
with other workers across the world. Moreover, the improvements in information
technology have led to the disintegration of the firm and new management techniques
that bring the market inside the firm in ways not experienced in recent history. As a
result, the American workplace has changed from one dominated by internal labor
markets with expectations of long-term employment to one dominated by global spot
markets for labor with no expectations except constant change.
The change in the American workplace from the paradigm of internal labor market
and lifetime employment to the paradigm ofinternational spotmarkets and short-term
employment raises a number of important issues in labor and employment law: How
will employers gain adequate information on prospective employees and monitor the
work of those employees while not infringing the employees' freedom from
defamation and right to privacy? How can we encourage employers to take an interest
in adequately training short-term employees? How can we promote the expression of
employees' collective voice in this market-driven atonistic environment? How do we
ensure employees opportunities for benefits and promotions in multiemployer
careers? Finally, how can the nations preserve their national sovereignty and their
ability to effectively regulate the employment relationship in a global economy?
These are the questions that will dominate labor and employment law for the
foreseeable future. Our resolution of these questions will determine our children's
and grandchildren's success, enjoyment, and fulfillment in their employment
relationships.
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